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Note
The Lawyer as Impresario: Form vs. Substance
in the Target's Boardroom
by
BARBARA J. GUSTAFSON*
Just twenty years ago, it was simply unheard of in polite society for
one corporation to launch a hostile raid on another corporation. Today,
a war of aggression is overrunning the once bucolic field of corporate
law; the practice of friendly, negotiated mergers has been displaced in an
era typified by unsolicited and bitterly opposed tender offers and battles
for corporate control.' This development has given rise to the creation of
a new vocabulary that includes such colorful terms as "raiders," "white
knights," and "poison pills." 2 This development has also created new
* Member, Third Year Class. The author gratefully acknowledges the guidance of Ju-
lian H. Levi, Professor of Law at University of California, Hastings College of the Law. With-
out his ideas, criticisms, and help, this Note would not have been possible. Professor Levi
participated in the settlement of Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), and also
contributed to the conceptualizing and shaping of this Symposium.
1. Improved communication technologies, improved access to stock markets, and the
growth of the securities industry have all contributed to increased stock market trading. See S.
JAFFE, BROKER-DEALERS AND SECURITIES MARKETS: A GUIDE TO THE REGULATORY PRO-
CESS 212-14 (1977). As these changes took hold, the character of major market investors
began to change as well. Large brokerage firms and investment companies began to occupy a
larger share of the securities markets. For example, between 1960 and 1969, while the share
volume on the New York Stock Exchange increased by 548%, the individual investor volume
increased by only 133%. During this same period, the relative proportion of institutional
trading to total trading volume increased from 25% to 50%. "The average size of an institu-
tional order increased from approximately 500 shares to approximately 3700 shares." Id. at
214 (citing INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY REPORT OF THE SECURITIES & EXCHANGE
COMMISSION Summary Volume Doc. No. 64, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 8, at 101-02 (1971)).
These changes in the market give corporate "raiders" (individual investors or companies that
seek to acquire other companies without the cooperation of the management of those compa-
nies) the opportunity to acquire more easily enough stock to gain control of the "target" (the
company being acquired).
2. The likeness of corporate takeover battles to the feudal wars of the Middle Ages has
not escaped some commentators:
A corporation that fears a raid by a Black Knight builds a Castle of charter
amendments and changes in its corporate structure designed to make a takeover diffi-
cult .... The King is petitioned repeatedly to promulgate a takeover law banning
from the Kingdom all raids and raiders or at least making raids well nigh impossible.
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legal problems-problems that the legal system has imperfectly
addressed.
This phenomenon of modern mergers and acquisitions raises broad
philosophical questions of policy, especially with respect to some of the
drastic defense techniques employed by target companies. One such
technique is capital restructuring. This technique has been sanctioned by
the courts; but the question remains whether this society should tolerate
the conversion of corporate assets into debt for the purpose of maintain-
ing corporate independence, even though such practice often leads to
corporate destabilization, loss of jobs, and office and plant closings. 3 Or
should American companies instead be encouraged to trim the fat, rid-
ding themselves of inefficient management that is not operating for the
maximization of shareholder profit?
Lawyers have come to play a principal role in the takeover drama.
But given that fact, what role should the lawyer assume when advising a
corporation that faces the threat of a takeover? Should the lawyer func-
tion merely as a hired gun who designs and implements legal strategies to
fit the desires of the board of directors? Or does the lawyer also have an
ultimate duty to protect the welfare of the shareholders?
If a raid does come, the Council [Board of Directors] is convened, the Clergy [invest-
ment bankers] is consulted and the mercenaries [legal counsel], if not already on
retainer, are hired.
If, despite the incantations of the Clergy and the sorties of the mercenaries, the
Castle is about to be invested and the serfs are about to rebel, in rides the White
Knight. He is a neighboring Count or foreign potentate of greater resources than the
Black Knight .... He vanquishes the Black Knight, repacifies the serfs and rebuilds
the Castle. But alas, it is the White Knight's men who now sit at the Council table.
The Count either swears fealty to his new overlord or joins his fellow exiles in Palm
Beach or La Jolla.
M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, TAKEOVERS & FREEZEOUTS at vii (1978).
3. See Miller, Safe At Home: How Indiana Shielded A Firm and Changed The Takeover
Business, Wall St. J., July 1, 1987, at 1, col. 6. This article tells the story of a takeover battle
between Arvin Industries of Columbus, Indiana and the Belzberg family. "The Belzbergs are
exactly the sort of takeover artists chief executives have in mind when they bemoan the ex-
cesses of merger mania." Id. Arvin was a civic-oriented company, donating school buildings,
summer youth camps, and other services to the town. A takeover by the Belzbergs would have
changed all that and made Columbus into a branch-plant town. Members of the Columbus
Chamber of Commerce were sure that the company's personality would change overnight:
" 'There's a kind of attitude you get from an out-of-town owner-the focus is on the bottom
line and the return to shareholders.' " Id. at 23, col. 1 (quoting Brooke Tuttle, an official at the
Columbus Chamber of Commerce).
The Belzbergs acquired a significant number of shares. The ensuing takeover battle be-
tween Arvin and the Belzbergs inspired Arvin's lawyer, James Strain, to help draft Indiana's
current anti-takeover statute, recently upheld by the United States Supreme Court as constitu-
tional. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987). This statute helped
to defeat the takeover attempt, but only after the raiders had made a sizeable profit when
Arvin repurchased the Belzberg shares. Miller, supra, Wall St. J., July 1, 1987, at 23, col. 5.
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Not surprisingly, there are no easy answers to these broad questions.
Yet one answer seems clear: lawyers should not have the power to con-
trol the fate of a corporation facing an attempted takeover.
This Note focuses upon the actions of target directors and their law-
yers when the corporation encounters a takeover threat. Because the role
of lawyers in the takeover process is wholly a function of both substan-
tive corporations law and theory, this Note addresses both of these influ-
ences together.
Lawyers, not unwittingly, have become indispensable in the merger
and takeover process. Defensive tactics to ward off takeovers are
designed, packaged, and sold by lawyers, along with a set of "how-to"
instructions.4 Additionally, lawyers are called upon to lead target direc-
tors through the virtual minefield of potential liability that Delaware5
courts have created in mapping the contours of the business judgment
rule.6 The Note contends that these developments in the law have ele-
vated the lawyer to the role of impresario:7 lawyers have been assigned
the duty of orchestrating and managing the takeover drama as it unfolds.
Although the lawyer's role as impresario may represent good busi-
ness for the legal profession, it does not translate into sound corporate
management. This Note argues that this expansion of the role of the
lawyer in the takeover context has created some complicated problems.
First, in the tender offer process, courts are sanctioning the broad, discre-
tionary use of manipulative defense strategies by target directors and
their lawyers. Second, in the statutory merger situation, in which direc-
tors should have the power to make takeover decisions, the courts have
4. See Moran v. Household Int'l, 500 A.2d 1346, 1349 (Del. 1985).
5. Delaware is generally regarded as possessing the most sophisticated body of corpo-
rate law. In the early stages of modern corporate history, Delaware adopted a liberal, nonre-
strictive corporations statute in an effort to attract charter revenue. In large part, this effort
was successful. See generally Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware,
83 YALE L.J. 663, 663-92 (1974) (tracing the legislative and jurisprudential history of Dela-
ware's corporations law legislatively and judicially). As a result, Delaware took the lead in
attracting companies to incorporate in that state. In recent years, many merger and acquisition
cases have been decided either in Delaware courts or through application of Delaware law.
Hence, it is the most appropriate body of law to focus upon in this Note.
For a history of the development of Delaware's corporate law, and a recommendation
that there ought to be federal minimum standards of state corporate law, see id. For a defense
of Delaware's role, see Arsht, A Reply to Professor Cary, 31 Bus. LAW. 1113 (1976).
6. See infra notes 84-111 and accompanying text.
7. Impresario is defined as "the projector, manager, or conductor of an opera or concert
company." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1136-37 (4th ed. 1976).
The metaphor is appropriate when one considers the case of Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d
858 (Del. 1985). The chairman of the board and chief executive officer of the Trans Union
Corporation, Jerome Van Gorkom, executed a merger agreement that resulted in a share-
holder class action naming him and Trans Union as defendants. Van Gorkom (also an attor-
ney) executed the agreement at a formal social event that he hosted for the opening of the
Chicago Lyric Opera. Id. at 869.
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developed an overly specific and burdensome procedural standard to es-
tablish the duty of care under the business judgment rule.
Both of these problems are symptoms of a more basic defect in this
area of jurisprudence: the courts have lost sight of the underlying con-
cern of shareholder welfare in both the tender offer and merger situa-
tions. This Note advocates a return to the more traditional standards of
corporate governance. Specifically, this Note proposes that courts
should prohibit target directors facing a hostile tender offer from adopt-
ing manipulative defense tactics that artificially control stock prices and
alter the corporate charter 8 without the consent of shareholders or that
place the company in financial jeopardy to achieve the desired ends of the
incumbent board. Directors should adopt strategies that help sharehold-
ers to make informed decisions.
This Note also advocates that courts abolish the complicated proce-
dural standards governing directors' actions in a statutory merger. The
courts should accord directors the traditional deference implicit in the
business judgment rule, rather than substitute their own judgment con-
cerning how to make corporate decisions. Directors need the inherent
flexibility of the rule to freely make swift decisions using their expertise
and knowledge as directors. Directors should be making these decisions,
not lawyers or judges.
Section I examines current Delaware statutes governing mergers
and tender offers and compares them with the statute governing sales of
corporate assets. While Delaware statutes explicitly authorize directors
to decide whether to sell corporate assets and to approve statutory merg-
ers, no such statutory authority exists in the area of tender offers. The
difference in treatment indicates that the legislature must have intended
to distinguish mergers from takeover situations with respect to the
amount of discretion afforded to directors.
Section I also reviews the present state of Delaware case law con-
cerning the business judgment rule and the judicially created rules dictat-
ing the role of target directors in mergers and tender offers. While
affording directors broad discretion in adopting defensive strategies to
8. The following are examples of this type of defensive tactic: the poison pill, see infra
text accompanying notes 55-60 and infra note 34; the self-tender, see infra note 34; creation of
artificial antitrust problems, see infra notes 34, 113-32 and accompanying text; and greenmail,
see infra note 34.
By terming certain defensive tactics "manipulative," this Note is not adopting the defini-
tion of "manipulative" under § 14(e) of the Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78(n)(e), as interpreted
by the United States Supreme Court in Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 12 (1985)
(holding that "manipulative" as used in § 14(e) requires misrepresentation or nondisclosure).
Instead, this Note terms a defensive tactic manipulative when, by adopting it, directors are
able to artificially control stock prices, change the corporate charter without the consent of
shareholders, or put the company in financial jeopardy.
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fend off tender offers, the courts have significantly narrowed the discre-
tion of target directors in making statutory merger agreements.
Section II examines the theories of Martin Lipton, an influential
practitioner in the mergers and acquisitions field.9 Lipton believes that
target directors may and should prepare defensive tactics to ward off cor-
porate raiders. He recommends a set of procedures for target directors to
follow in a takeover or merger situation to minimize the risk of director
liability to shareholders. Lipton's formula has enjoyed great success
before the Delaware courts and, consequently, with corporations as well.
Section III surveys the influence of Lipton's formula in Delaware
through an analysis of three cases.
Section IV highlights the failings of Lipton's formula by examining
in detail two cases. First, certain defensive tactics artificially manipulate
stock market prices and the corporate charter. Such manipulation is
outside the scope of the proper role of target directors. The negative ef-
fect of these defensive tactics is vividly illustrated in Panter v. Marshall
Field & Co. 10 Second, Lipton's theory results in an emphasis on form
and procedure in the directors' exercise of business judgment that ignores
the substantive outcome of the decision. Consequently, courts adhering
to the Lipton theory disregard the directors' expertise in corporate deci-
sion-making, and instead substitute their own judgment when directors
do not follow the prescribed procedures. No case better demonstrates
this triumph of form over substance than Smith v. Van Gorkom (Trans
Union)," a 1985 Delaware Supreme Court decision.
Section V argues that it is inappropriate for lawyers to take such an
active role in corporate control battles. In general, lawyers do not have
the authority or the needed expertise to decide the future of their corpo-
rate clients. Given the recent developments in Delaware case law, how-
ever, lawyers have accepted the role of impresario out of demand and
necessity. Directors, looking for ways to insulate themselves from take-
over bids, have turned to lawyers to implement and justify defensive tac-
tics. In response, lawyers have supplied the whole defensive tactics
package and have developed a complicated procedural test that the Dela-
ware courts have adopted to examine directors' business judgment.
Section V then proposes that directors, and therefore lawyers,
should not have the power to manipulate the corporate charter or stock
market prices by adopting defensive tactics to ward off tender offers.
9. Martin Lipton is a member of the New York Bar and a partner at Wachtell, Lipton,
Rosen & Katz, specializing in mergers and acquisitions. See Lipton, Takeover Bids in the
Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAW. 101 (1979).
10. 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981); see infra notes 113-32 and
accompanying text. I I
11. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985); see infra notes 133-45 and accompanying text.
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This type of manipulative posturing disregards shareholder welfare and
often may be motivated solely by directors' self-interest.
This Note further proposes that Delaware courts need to reassess
the procedural standards they have adopted under the duty-of-care re-
quirement of the business judgment rule in analyzing statutory merger
agreements. Just as there is more than one way to skin a cat, there is
more than one way to make an informed business judgment. Courts
should not prescribe such specific requirements while purporting to as-
sess board action under a deferential standard.
In addition, while proposing greater deference to the business judg-
ment of directors, this Note also strongly advocates that the courts safe-
guard shareholder welfare by more closely scrutinizing directors'
fulfillment of their duty of loyalty. As is currently the case, this examina-
tion of a director's possible conflicts of interest should be a threshold
determination made before the courts confer the protections of the busi-
ness judgment rule upon the directors. Because of the very real possibil-
ity that directors may be acting out of self-interest, particularly when
responding to tender offers, the judiciary should be exceptionally watch-
ful for possible self-dealing.
If such reforms are made, the court's review will more accurately
assess the proper role of directors in making these business decisions.
The court will thus afford deference when it is warranted, while closely
monitoring directors' motives for any impropriety. In this way, the court
will not simply be substituting its own judgment for that of directors.
These reforms will also result in courts and directors becoming more re-
sponsive to the interests of shareholders.
Section VI demonstrates that although the Lipton formula has en-
joyed broad support in the 1980s, it is now losing ground in Delaware. A
recent Delaware Supreme Court case disputes the unbridled discretion of
directors to formulate defensive tactics. 12 Additionally, a recently en-
acted Delaware statute has emasculated Trans Union by limiting direc-
tors' liability under the duty-of-care requirement of the business
judgment rule.13 Section VI examines both the recent case and statute.
I. Directors' Duties Under Delaware Law
This section first examines the Delaware statutes governing the role
of directors in making merger agreements and responding to tender of-
fers, and compares these statutes' requirements with those of the statute
governing the role of a director in the sale of corporate assets. It then
traces the development of Delaware case law concerning the application
12. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1985); see infra
notes 170-77 and accompanying text.
13. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 1986) (amended 1986); see infra notes
166-69 and accompanying text.
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of the business judgment rule to target directors' responses to takeover
bids.
A. Delaware Statutes
The role of target management in responding to a merger proposal is
governed by state law. The relevant Delaware statute does not prescribe
any specific procedure for directors to follow when faced with such a
situation. 14 Once the directors of the target corporation have voted in
favor of the merger, the statute calls for the board of directors of each
involved corporation to adopt a resolution approving the merger. The
statute, however, does not specify criteria a target's directors should con-
sider in their initial decision-making process.1 5 The merger agreement
must contain the various terms and conditions of the merger, specific
terms for carrying out the merger, any amendments to the charter of the
surviving corporation, the manner of converting shares, and any other
desirable information.16 The directors must submit the merger agree-
ment to the stockholders of each corporation to act upon at an annual or
special meeting.1 7 The statute requires that due notice to the stockhold-
ers of the time, place, and purpose of the meeting be mailed to the stock-
holders at least twenty days prior to the meeting date.' 8
Tender offers' 9 are regulated under both federal and state law.
Under federal law, the Williams Act regulates disclosure by the bidder in
takeovers.20 The Act primarily insures that shareholders confronted
with a tender offer have adequate information with which to decide
whether to tender their shares. 21 Under the Delaware general corpora-
tion law, section 203 requires the bidder to notify the target of his inten-
tion to make a tender offer.22 The bidder must provide certain basic
information to the target corporation, including his name and address,
the number of shares and manner of acceptance required by the tender
14. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(b) (1974).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. § 251(c).
18. Id.
19. For purposes of Delaware state law, a tender offer may be defined as
any offer to purchase or invitation to tender equity securities for purchase made by
an offeror to more than 30 of the holders of equity securities of any corporation
organized under [the General Corporation Law of Delaware] if, after the consumma-
tion thereof, the offeror and any associate of the offeror would own beneficially, di-
rectly or indirectly, more than five percent of any class of the outstanding equity
securities of the corporation.
Id. § 203(c)(2).
20. 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1982). Federal law issues in this area are beyond the scope of this
Note, which focuses only on Delaware state law.
21. Id. § 14(e).
22. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203(a)(1) (1974).
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offer, any interest he has in the target corporation (including the number
of target corporation shares he presently owns), and, under certain cir-
cumstances, copies of the bidder's corporate balance sheet for the past
year and income statements for the previous three years.23
The only other guidance provided by the Delaware corporation stat-
ute for directors in merger or tender offer situations is contained in the
description of the general power of the board of directors. Section 141(a)
provides that, barring certain exceptions not relevant here, the business
and affairs of Delaware corporations "shall be managed by or under the
direction of a board of directors .... "24 The Delaware courts have rec-
ognized that the board's managerial decision-making power derives from
this general provision and have created the "business judgment rule" as a
mechanism to give recognition and deference to the business expertise of
directors in the exercise of their managerial power. 25
These sections of the Delaware code provide the only statutory
guidelines for directors to follow in responding to a takeover bid or pre-
paring a merger agreement. Thus, the statutory law provides no specific
procedure with respect to how much information directors should collect
before making a response, what type of interplay should occur between
the shareholders and the board of directors in the tender offer situation,
or the legality of various defensive tactics that may be used to ward off
potential tender offers. Delaware courts and other courts applying Dela-
ware law, however, have carved out detailed rules that address these is-
sues. These judicial rules will be examined in the next section.
It is important to note the procedural differences between the stat-
utes governing mergers and those governing tender offers. While the
merger statute does not explicitly provide a procedure that directors
should use in reaching a merger agreement, it does require the directors
to adopt a resolution that the shareholders must later ratify. 26 In con-
trast, a tender offer is made directly to the shareholders. 27 The statute
provides no guidance as to the proper role of the directors not only
before the tender offer is made, but also while it is outstanding. Under
present judicial interpretations, during this time period directors may
erect defenses to the unsolicited tender offer if they have not done so
already. 28
23. Id.
24. Id. § 141.
25. See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 782 (Del. 1981).
26. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (1974).
27. Id. § 203(c)(2).
28. See, e.g., Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 283 (7th Cir.), cert. denied.
454 U.S. 1092 (1981) (shareholders could not recover for lost opportunity to tender shares due
to fashioning of defensive tactics by target directors in anticipation of takeover attempt): Rev-
lon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173, 180 (Del. 1986) (under DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (1974), a target board has the power to adopt defensive tactics, such
[Vol. 39
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Conversely, the procedure the board of directors should follow dur-
ing the sale of "substantially all" corporate assets2 9 is given much more
precise definition in the Delaware statutes. Section 271(a) provides:
Every corporation may at any meeting of its board of directors or gov-
erning body sell, lease, or exchange all or substantially all of its prop-
erty and assets . . . upon such terms and conditions and for such
consideration ... as its board of directors or governing body deems expe-
dient and for the best interests of the corporation, when and as author-
ized by a resolution adopted by a majority of the outstanding stock of
the corporation. .... 30
This statute clearly defines the respective roles of directors and share-
holders in this type of sale. The directors are empowered to make the
decision to sell for whatever consideration they deem appropriate. A ma-
jority of the shareholders must then approve the action.31
The Delaware legislature expressly gave directors the power to de-
cide to sell all or substantially all corporate assets, provided that they
adhere to the prescribed procedure. The statutes governing mergers, on
the other hand, while affording some limited guidance, do not prescribe
any particular decision-making procedure. Likewise, the statute gov-
erning tender offers provides little guidance concerning the role of the
director in a takeover situation. As discussed in the following section,
however, the courts have filled this statutory gap with a body of case law
defining directors' duties under the business judgment rule.
B. Case Law: The Business Judgment Rule
The takeover battle typically begins when the general investing pub-
as poison pills, in anticipation of takeover attempt); Moran v. Household Int'l, 500 A.2d 1346,
1353 (Del. 1985) (same); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 953 (Del. 1985)
(DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a), together with § 160(a), gives target board power to deal in
its own stock, and fashion self-tender defensive tactic).
29. The standard of what constitutes a sale of "substantially all" corporate assets has
been difficult for the courts to define. In Gimbel v. Signal Cos., Inc., the Delaware Court of
Chancery arrived at the following definition:
"[T]he critical factor in determining the character of a sale of assets is generally
considered not the amount of property sold but whether the sale is in fact an unusual
transaction or one made in the regular course of business of the seller." . . . Every
transaction out of normal routine does not necessarily require shareholder approval.
The unusual nature of the transaction must strike at the heart of the corporate exist-
ence and purpose.
316 A.2d 599, 606 (Del. Ch.) (quoting Philadelphia Nat'l Bank v. B.S.F. Co., 41 Del. Ch. 509,
515, 199 A.2d 557, 561, rev'don other grounds, 204 A.2d 746 (Del. 1964)), aff'dper curiam on
limited grounds, 316 A.2d 619 (Del. 1974).
30. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 271(a) (1974) (emphasis added).
31. Id. It is interesting to note that shareholders dissenting from approval of the sale are
not given a right to appraisal, as are shareholders dissenting from ratification of a merger
agreement. Id. § 262 (defining appraisal rights for dissenting shareholders in a merger, but
omitting mention of appraisal rights for sale of corporate assets unless provided for in the
articles of incorporation).
March 1988]
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lic perceives that a target company's stock is undervalued in light of its
assets and prospective profitability. 32 A bidder, acting on this percep-
tion, will announce that he intends to commence a tender offer 33 for the
purchase of the company's stock. At this point, a shareholder typically
has three options: retain his shares, tender them to the bidder when the
offer becomes effective, or dispose of the stock in the open market.
At the same time, the target board will review the proposal; if the
tender offer is perceived as hostile, a fight between the raider and the
target for control of the company may ensue. When the target directors
step in to block a tender offer, they may utilize any of a number of crea-
tive and inventive strategies, which are generally termed "defensive tac-
tics."' 34 The intended effect of such defensive tactics, of course, is to
cause the bidder to withdraw the tender offer or actual bid.
32. See Responsibilities of Corporate Officers and Directors Under Federal Securities Laws,
[1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 701, at 69 (May 21, 1986) [hereinafter
Responsibilities of Corporate Officers]. In modern corporate accounting, cost is the basic valua-
tion guide for most corporate assets. Recognition of profits from assets on the balance sheet is
normally deferred until they have been realized, i.e., until the firm has exchanged its products,
services, or resources in a market transaction. See E. FARiS, ACCOUNTING FOR LAWYERS 297
(3d ed. 1975). The result of this method of valuation is that assets, such as land that the
company has acquired, remain valued at the amount for which they were originally purchased,
and no increase in market value is recorded until those assets are sold. Accordingly, the mar-
ket value of assets is not reflected in stock market prices.
Raiders commonly want to acquire control of the target company so they can liquidate
undervalued assets such as property. Sir James Goldsmith's acquisition of Crown Zellerbach
is a good example of this motivation. Before the takeover, Crown Zellerbach had owned
nearly two million acres of valuable timberland for almost half a century. Gilbert, Hobson's
Choice: James Goldsmith Cuts a Mean Deal, Barron's, Apr. 21, 1986, at 16, col. 2. After
investing roughly $570 million to gain control of 48% of the stock of Crown Zellerbach, Gold-
smith became chairman with a majority of the board composed of his nominees. He took an
"axe to the company, or rather a scalpel, surgically removing those valuable timberlands .. "
Id. Goldsmith ultimately turned his $570 million dollar investment into assets with a potential
value of nearly $1.7 billion, the independently appraised value of the timber and other assets.
Id. at 22, col. 4. After deducting the value of the other assets of which Goldsmith acquired
control in the deal, the effective price tag for the trees was just $195 million. Id. at 22, col. 2.
33. For a discussion of disclosure requirements pertaining to tender offers, see supra
notes 19-23 and accompanying text.
34. Some of the current popular defensive tactics are:
(1) Poison Pill: This defense renders the takeover prohibitively expensive through the
issuance of a special class of stock-the "poison pill"-that the bidder will have to "swallow"
if he attains a certain percentage of stock, usually about 20%. One variety of the poison pill is
a provision in the charter for a "special class of preferred stock for distribution to shareholders
as a dividend. In the event of a hostile takeover (the triggering event), this preferred stock
becomes convertible into stock calling for high dividend payments, forcing the bidder to either
purchase the shares at a high price or pay the expensive dividends." Responsibilities of Corpo-
rate Officers, supra note 32, 702, at 70; see, e.g., Moran v. Household Int'l, 500 A.2d 1346,
1348-49 (Del. 1985).
(2) Sale of Crown Jewels: The "crown jewel" is that asset belonging to the target that
makes the company an attractive takeover target. The target attempts to ward off a hostile
tender offer by selling this asset to another party. This sale may discourage the bidder from
[Vol. 39
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Courts apply the business judgment rule to analyze the authority of
the incumbent directors to utilize defensive tactics in response to tender
offers, as well as the propiety of a board's decision to execute a merger.
Simply stated, the rule is a judicial creation that affords recognition of
and deference to the business expertise of directors exercising managerial
powers under section 141(a) of the Delaware corporation statutes.35 The
business judgment rule is a "presumption that in making a business deci-
sion, the directors of a corporation act on an informed basis, in good
faith, and in the honest belief that the action is taken in the best interests
of the company."'36 The rule requires the court to respect that business
judgment, absent an abuse of the board's discretion. 37
The standard justification offered for the rule is that, because it is
generally presumed that judges lack the competence required for sound
business decision-making, the judiciary should not substitute its own
business judgment for that of directors.38 Accordingly, Delaware courts
will not overturn a board's decision if that decision can be attributed to
going forward and help the company raise cash to use in implementing additional defense
tactics. Responsibilities of Corporate Officers, supra note 32, 702, at 70.
(3) Lock-Up Options: Such an agreement gives a favored bidder an advantage in acquir-
ing the target company over other real or potential bidders. Types of "lock-ups" include op-
tions to purchase treasury or unissued shares, or options to buy target company assets. Id.;
see, eg., Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 270-71 (2d Cir.
1986).
(4) Golden Parachutes: A generous retirement or pension plan for upper-level target
management, payable if a hostile bidder acquires control of the company. Responsibilities of
Corporate Officers, supra note 32, % 702, at 70.
(5) Greenmail: A practice in which the target eliminates the threat of a hostile bid by
purchasing from the raider (typically at a substantial premium over the then current market
price) all shares in the target company that the raider has accumulated. The target thus
purchases its independence in exchange for guaranteeing to the raider a hefty profit. Id.
(6) Self-tender: Target management attempts to block the hostile bid by making a tender
offer for its own shares. The repurchase defeats the bidder's efforts by removing shares from
his reach. This practice may have the additional effect of weakening the financial condition of
the target company, making it a less attractive acquisition. Responsibilities of Corporate Of-
ficers, supra note 32, % 707, at 79; see, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum, 493 A.2d 946,
953-54 (Del. 1985).
7) Creation of Antitrust Problems: The target management acquires assets that might
create an antitrust problem if the bidder were to acquire ownership of such assets. This ma-
neuver discourages the bidder due to the possible antitrust implications and, like a self-tender,
may further discourage the bidder by weakening the financial condition of the target company.
See, eg., Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 277-81 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1092 (1981).
35. See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 782 (Del. 1981).
36. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (citing Kaplan v. Centex Corp., 284
A.2d 119, 124 (Del. Ch. 1971), and Robinson v. Pittsburgh Oil Refinery Corp., 126 A. 46 (Del.
Ch. 1924)).
37. Id.
38. See Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule and the Trans Union Case, 40 Bus. LAW.
1437, 1439 (1985).
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any rational business purpose. 39 In most cases, the party challenging the
board's action bears the burden of establishing facts rebutting the pre-
sumption of a good faith and informed decision. 40
The Delaware Supreme Court has delineated two major prerequi-
sites for the rule's invocation: the observance by the board of both its
duty of loyalty and its duty of care.41 The duty of loyalty requires direc-
tors who claim the presumption of sound business judgment to be disin-
terested in the transaction. Hence, directors may neither appear on both
sides of a transaction nor expect to derive from it, through self-dealing,
any personal financial benefit as opposed to a benefit that extends to all
shareholders in general. 42 In Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., the
Delaware Supreme Court found that when the target board addresses a
pending takeover bid, an enhanced duty of loyalty arises. 43 Because an
inherent conflict arises when the board faces a threat over corporate con-
trol,4 4 there is an "omnipresent specter that a board may be acting pri-
marily in its own interests, rather than those of the corporation and its
shareholders . . . -45 This enhanced duty calls for a threshold judicial
determination of whether any conflicts of interest exist before the court
may confer the protection of the business judgment rule.46
Under the duty of care, "directors have a duty to inform themselves,
prior to making a business decision, of all material information reason-
ably available to them."' 47 As discussed in section III, the Delaware
Supreme Court has refined its standard for the duty of care by scrutiniz-
ing the procedural actions taken by directors. 48
Once directors have adequately considered the relevant information
reasonably available to them, they must execute their responsibilities
with the requisite degree of care. Whether a director has met his obliga-
39. Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971).
40. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812. In Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum, however, the Dela-
ware Supreme Court held that when a board implements defensive tactics there arises "the
omnipresent specter that a board may be acting primarily in its own interests, rather than
those of the corporation and its shareholders .... " 493 A.2d 946, 954-55 (Del. 1985). The
court found that this potential for conflict placed the burden upon the directors to show that
they had reasonable grounds for believing there was a danger to corporate policy and effective-
ness; this burden may be met by a showing of good faith and reasonable investigation. Id. at
955.
41. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812-13.
42. Id.
43. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954.
44. Id. at 955 (quoting Bennett v. Propp, 187 A.2d 405, 409 (1962)).
45. Id. at 954.
46. Under this standard, directors must show they have reasonable grounds for believing
that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed. Id. In practice, however, the Dela-
ware courts have not used this threshold determination to do a searching inquiry of directors'
motives in fashioning defensive tactics. See infra notes 154-57 and accompanying text.
47. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812-13 (Del. 1984).
48. See infra notes 84-111 and accompanying text.
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tions under the duty of care is determined by an application of a standard
of gross negligence; that is to say, a director will incur liability to the
shareholders only if he has been grossly negligent in the fulfillment of his
obligations. 49
The Delaware Supreme Court applies the business judgment rule to
actions taken by target directors in both merger and takeover contexts, 50
whether the directors have acted to accept or to forestall a bid.5 1 In
applying the deferential business judgment rule to directors who have
fashioned defensive tactics in response to a takeover threat, the court has
chosen to view such conduct as falling within the scope of the broad
power of the board to act under its fundamental duty to protect the cor-
porate enterprise and shareholders against harm reasonably perceived.52
Delaware courts have thus extrapolated the power of directors to inter-
fere with tender offers from the directors' more traditional powers relat-
ing to corporate changes, such as charter amendments, mergers, sales of
assets, and dissolutions, in which director action is a prerequisite to the
ultimate disposition of the matter.5 3
The problem with this extrapolation by the Delaware courts is that
it disregards the fact that the tender offer is made directly to the share-
holders, and not to the directors. By giving discretion to the directors to
fashion defensive tactics under the business judgment rule, the Delaware
Supreme Court is taking a great leap of faith. The court assumes that the
statutory grant of broad general power to act in matters of corporate
governance confers upon the directors the power to favor or oppose
tender offers as they choose, so long as they remain within the limits of
the business judgment rule.
There are two discernible flaws in this assumption. First, there is no
statutory basis on which to ground this power, as there is with the more
classical types of corporate changes, such as mergers, sales of assets, and
49. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812-13. In discussing the fiduciary obligations of a director to
the corporation, Delaware courts often quote the following language from the seminal case of
Guth v. Loft, Ina:
A public policy, existing through the years, and derived from a profound knowl-
edge of human characteristics and motives, has established a rule that demands of a
corporate officer or director, peremptorily and inexorably, the most scrupulous ob-
servance of his duty, not only affirmatively to protect the interests of the corporation
committed to his charge, but also to refrain from doing anything that would work
injury to the corporation, or to deprive it of profit or advantage which his skill and
ability might properly bring to it, or to enable it to make in the reasonable and lawful
exercise of its powers. The rule that requires an undivided and unselfish loyalty to
the corporation demands that there shall be no conflict between duty and self-
interest.
5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939).
50. See Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 627 (Del. 1984).
51. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 954 n.8.
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dissolutions. 54
Second, some of the defensive tactics used by directors, such as
"poison pills," 55 for example, may manipulate stock prices. This influ-
ence may result in a discriminatory reclassification of stock, or may de-
flate the price of other target stock.56 Even if the poison pill is never
triggered, its adoption may cause the price of the stock to fall because the
implementing company becomes less desirable to potential bidders. 57
Third, some defensive tactics may manipulate the corporate charter.
Poison pills, for example, often create a new class of stock, an action that
under other circumstances requires amendment of the corporate char-
ter. 58 Although amendment of the corporate charter under Delaware law
requires a ratification vote by shareholders, 59 poison pills may be adopted
unilaterally by the board of directors. 60
Similar arguments can be made against other manipulative defensive
tactics; for example, creation of artificial antitrust problems, the self-
tender of company shares, the payment of greenmail, and the granting of
lock-up options. The problem common to all these tactics is a disregard
for shareholder welfare-in all this intricate plotting and posturing, the
directors are not properly considering the effects of their actions in light
of the best interests of the shareholders.
This Note contends that the business judgment rule should not be
stretched to cover target directors' fashioning of manipulative defensive
strategies to ward off tender offers. The controversy explored in the fol-
lowing sections revolves around how the court determines that target di-
rectors have made an informed decision under the duty-of-care
requirement of the business judgment rule. The issues surrounding the
use of defensive tactics are intricately intertwined with the duty of target
directors to make informed business decisions.
II. Defensive Tactics and Informed Decision-Making:
The "Lipton Formula"
A. Defensive Tactics
Inventive lawyers and corporate directors have developed a number
of defensive responses to takeover bids. 61 Generally, the Delaware courts
have allowed target directors wide discretion when shareholders have
54. See supra notes 14-31 and accompanying text.
55. See supra note 34 for a definition of poison pill.
56. See Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 255 (7th Cir. 1986), rev'don
other grounds, 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987).
57. See id. at 257.
58. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(a)(3), (5) (1974).
59. Id. § 242(c)(2).
60. See Responsibilities of Corporate Officers, supra note 32, 707, at 78.
61. See supra note 34 for examples of defensive tactics.
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challenged the use of these tactics. The directors need only advance a
plausible rationale to justify the use of these tactics, such as that the
board must guard against the "bust-up" of the company by a bidder or
raider. 62
One of the most influential of these inventive attorneys is Martin
Lipton.6 3 The essence of Lipton's thesis is that target directors can and
should discourage takeovers through defensive tactics, for better manage-
ment of the business of the company. 64 He begins with the general prop-
osition that the present system of corporate governance has given the
directors the responsibility to safeguard interests broader than those of
the shareholder alone. 65 He contends that, in some situations, it is good
business practice for directors to maintain a policy of corporate indepen-
dence. By so doing, the corporation assures its customers, employees,
suppliers, and the communities in which it does business that it intends
to maintain its current business policies. 66 The "bust-up" takeover, in
which the buyer sells off pieces of the company, tends to adversely affect
employees and others financially interested in the continued successful
operation of the target company. 67
Lipton also argues that there is no empirical evidence to support the
allegation that shareholders always win when directors are forced to ac-
cept takeover bids. Indeed, he asserts that stock prices usually go up
after a rejection of a tender offer.68 Based on these premises, he con-
cludes that directors should have the discretion to reject a tender offer, or
to destroy the bidder's initiative to make a tender offer, even though such
action deprives shareholders of the opportunity to tender their shares.
Furthermore Lipton asserts that the shareholders should not be af-
forded the right to accept or reject directly the takeover bid, even if they
are dissatisfied with the directors' rejection of a takeover bid. To do so,
he argues, would be the equivalent of mandating the sale of the com-
pany. 69 Such a mandate, according to Lipton, would force directors to
make frequent assessments or whether to sell or liquidate the company as
62. The term "bust-up" refers to the situation in which a bidder finances an acquisition
by selling off pieces of the acquired company. See Moran v. Household Int'l, 500 A.2d 1346,
1349 n.4 (Del. 1985). Numerous other justifications for the fashioning and invocation of de-
fensive tactics exist as well. They include the poor quality of the raider's securities, failure of
the raider to make material disclosures, and antitrust issues. See Lipton, supra note 9, at 117.
63. Mr. Lipton has authored a number of articles and books. Among his more influential
works are Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom, see Lipton, supra note 9, and a book he
authored with Erica Steinberger, TAKEOVERS AND FREEZEOUTS, see M. LIPTON & E. STEIN-
BERGER, supra note 2.
64. See Lipton, supra note 9, at 109-12.
65. Id. at 106.
66. Id. at 110.
67. See Moran, 500 A.2d at 1349.
68. Lipton, supra note 9, at 106-09.
69. Id. at 116.
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a part of their fiduciary obligations. Preoccupation with this duty would
shorten directors' management perspective from long- to short-term and
have a detrimental impact on the way corporations operate. 70
Lipton expresses valid concerns about "bust-up" takeovers and the
instability that can result. Yet a takeover may also result in a leaner,
more efficient company in which assets are moved to more productive
uses and into the hands of better managers.71
Such an eventuality may or may not maximize shareholder welfare;
what is objectionable about Lipton's construct is that it ignores the share-
holder. By excluding the shareholder from the decision-making process,
Lipton leaves the door wide open to board decisions motivated by self-
interest. While he argues that shareholders actually benefit from these
defensive tactics because the price of the target's stock eventually rises
after the rejection of a tender offer, Lipton fails to take into account the
many other reasons why stock prices might rise over a period of years. 72
As discussed above, exclusive control of a tender offer response by
directors allows for the manipulation of stock prices and of the charter. 73
This manipulation illustrates how Lipton's endorsement of defensive
tactics ignores shareholders. Adoption of a poison pill plan, for example,
deprives shareholders of their vote to amend the charter, whereas such
ratification is required by the Delaware statute when new classes of stock
are created.74 Similarly, it is difficult to see how directors are considering
shareholder welfare when they put the target company into financial
jeopardy by authorizing a self-tender for company shares to prevent a
raider from accumulating additional shares.75
Lipton's views on the proper role of target directors receive critical
support from the Delaware courts' agreement that the implementation of
70. Id. at 109-10.
71. Professor Fischel and Judge Easterbrook rely heavily upon this premise in arguing
that directors should be completely passive in responding to tender offers. See Easterbrook &
Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94
HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981). The author of this Note does not profess to be an economics
expert on what does or does not maximize shareholder welfare. Instead, the author argues
that Lipton's theory ignores shareholder welfare.
72. Lipton included a table in his article that compares stock prices of companies before,
during, and after tender offer bids. In one example, he compares prices in the takeover battle
between Universal Leaf Tobacco (target) and Congoleum (raider). The takeover offer was
made on October 8, 1976. One month prior to the offer the target's stock price was S12.13; one
week prior it was S 11.94. The raider's offer price was $16.25. Three years later, on August 10,
1979, the target's stock price was $23.25. See Lipton, supra note 9, at 107.
73. See supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text.
74. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(a)(3) (1974).
75. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 950-51 (Del. 1985)
(board advised that primary effect of self-tender would be to curtail company's operations;
board approved self-tender).
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manipulative defense tactics constitutes a valid exercise by directors of
their statutory discretionary powers.
The following subsection focuses on the second part of the Lipton
formula, which concerns the actual process that directors undertake
when making informed business judgments.
B. The Informed Business Judgment
Lipton does not stop with simply advocating the propriety of man-
agement responding unilaterally in a tender offer situation. He goes on
to prescribe a formula that will assure "the appearance and actuality of a
good faith decision [made] on a reasonable basis."' 76 These procedures
are admittedly designed to minimize or eliminate conflicts with those
shareholders who believe that self-interest may be guiding the directors'
decisions.77 The basic formula is as follows:
A) Management (usually with the help of investment bankers and
outside legal counsel) should make a full presentation of all of the fac-
tors relevant to the consideration by the directors of the takeover
bid ....
B) An independent investment banker or other expert should
opine as to the adequacy of the price offered and management's
presentation.
C) Outside legal counsel should opine as to the antitrust and
other legal and regulatory issues in the takeover and as to whether the
directors have received adequate information on which to base a rea-
sonable decision.
D) If a majority of the directors are officers or otherwise might be
deemed to be personally interested, other than as shareholders, a com-
mittee of independent directors ... from a litigation strategy stand-
point may be desirable ....
E) It is reasonable for the directors of a target to reject a takeover
on any one of the following grounds:
(1) inadequate price
(2) wrong time to sell
(3) illegality
(4) adverse impact on constituencies other than shareholders
(5) risk of nonconsummation
(6) failure to provide equally for all shareholders
(7) doubt as to quality of the raider's securities in an exchange
offer. 78
Lipton believes that the vast majority of takeover bids are those in
which reasonable people could differ on the adequacy of the price of-
fered. 79 In these situations, Lipton assumes that "as long as the directors
76. Lipton, supra note 9, at 131.
77. Id. at 121.
78. Id. at 121-22 (footnotes omitted).
79. Id. at 121.
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act in good faith and on a reasonable basis, their decision to accept or
reject a takeover bid should not be subject to being second guessed."'80
He concludes that, if the above set of procedures is followed, there will be
sufficient objective indicia to show they have made a reasonable good-
faith decision, allowing application of the business judgment rule.8'
What is interesting in this formula is how outside legal counsel and
investment bankers become virtually indispensable. Although the ulti-
mate decision-making power rests with the board of directors, it is heav-
ily guided and influenced by outsiders-namely lawyers and investment
bankers-who package and vouch for the adequacy of information that
often originates from management itself.
Lipton elevates the lawyer's role to that of impresario. The lawyer
is asked to do far more than merely counsel his client; he is called upon
to orchestrate and manage the takeover response. Lawyers and invest-
ment bankers assume the role of expert in the mergers and acquisitions
field. This line of reasoning concludes that directors should rely on these
outsiders' opinions concerning price, options, and whether a given course
of action is proper. This focus on procedure de-emphasizes the other
critical factors that inform corporate decision-making: the directors' ex-
perience and expertise gained by virtue of their education and position in
the corporation. Section IV examines some of the effects of this emphasis
on procedure.
Significantly, Lipton advises that companies not prepare a "black
book" list of procedures because later it "may be used to embarrass man-
agement.., that states it has acted in good faith and carefully considered
a raider's offer."'8 2 Instead, he advises that the preparation of such a
procedural checklist should be left to outside counsel and investment
bankers.8 3
Lipton's formula has enjoyed widespread acceptance in the 1980s,
both in the courts and in corporate boardrooms. The formula provides
some assurance of insulation to target directors making controversial de-
cisions. The next section examines three cases that evidence the popular-
ity of the formula.
III. The Influence of the Formula
Although Lipton's influence can be traced in many Delaware opin-
ions, three cases demonstrate particularly well its popularity in both
tender offer and merger situations.
In Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.,84 the plaintiff brought a class action
80. Id.
81. Id. at 124.
82. M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, supra note 2, at 6-15.
83. Id.
84. 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
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challenging the elimination of UOP's minority stockholders through a
cash-out merger85 between UOP and its majority owner, The Signal
Companies. The Delaware Supreme Court held, after analyzing the fair-
ness of the transaction, that material information was withheld from mi-
nority shareholders and that this amounted to a breach of the directors'
fiduciary duty of loyalty. 86
In its analysis of the transaction and ultimate conclusion that it had
been unfair to the minority shareholders, the court emphasized two as-
pects of fairness: fair dealing and fair price. Fair dealing concerns "ques-
tions of when the transaction was timed, how it was initiated, structured,
negotiated, disclosed to the directors, and how the approvals of the direc-
tors and the stockholders were obtained."'87 While this broad standard
may seem reasonable at first blush, what it apparently calls for is an anal-
ysis of the structure of the transaction in excruciating detail. This is
readily apparent from the detailed discussion of the facts in the court's
opinion. 88
UOP had a total of four business days to assess the cash-out merger
proposal from Signal. UOP's president retained an investment banking
firm, Lehman Brothers, to assess quickly the fairness of the price offered
to minority shareholders. He hired this firm for two reasons. First, be-
cause Lehman Brothers had acted as UOP's investment banker for many
years, it would probably be in the best position to respond on short no-
tice. Second, one of UOP's directors, James W. Glanville, was a partner
at Lehman Brothers and had advised UOP on financial matters for many
years.
Glanville accepted the assignment for Lehman Brothers. Glanville
remarked at the outset that the proposed price of twenty-one dollars per
share seemed fair, because it represented a fifty-percent premium over
UOP's then market price. Glanville did not personally work on the fair-
ness opinion. A team from Lehman Brothers examined the relevant doc-
uments and information and performed a "due diligence" visit to UOP
headquarters during which visit they interviewed UOP's president, gen-
eral counsel, and other key executives and personnel.
The team reported to Glanville, concluding that a price of twenty-
one or twenty-two dollars per share would be fair for the remaining out-
standing shares. Glanville and a senior member of the team flew to UOP
headquarters to attend the scheduled directors' meeting. Glanville re-
viewed the team report on the way, but did not have the final fairness
85. A cash-out merger is one in which the acquiring company buys the outstanding stock
of the target company for a cash price, on a friendly basis. See id. at 705.
86. Id. at 711-12. The duty of loyalty was breached because some of the directors served
on both the UOP and Signal boards and participated in the UOP board's decision without fully
disclosing the conflict of interest.
87. Id. at 711.
88. The following facts are abstracted from the court's opinion. Id. at 706-08.
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opinion letter prepared until either during or immediately prior to the
directors' meeting.
The court found that the circumstances surrounding this "rather
cursory preparation" of the opinion letter should have been disclosed to
minority shareholders. 89 It faulted both the board's representation that
the opinion was the product of a careful study,90 as well as the manner of
preparation of the opinion letter itself. Of particular concern to the court
was the fact that, while the report was being prepared, Glanville had
spent the weekend in Vermont and that the opinion letter had been pre-
pared at the last minute.91
It is obvious from this portion of the opinion that the court, in as-
sessing fairness, placed great importance on the procedure followed.
Although Glanville, by virtue of his position and tenure at UOP, was
probably the best qualified to assess a fair price for UOP minority share-
holders' stock, the court confined itself to looking at Glanville's actions
and concluded that the opinion was "rushed" and "performed under
difficulty." 92
Lipton stresses that lawyers should advise target directors to retain
outside investment bankers to determine the adequacy of the price, as
well as the adequacy of the board's consideration of the merger proposal.
In Weinberger, the court not only exhibited a similar preference for the
opinions of outside investment bankers, but also went went one step fur-
ther; it analyzed the adequacy of the methods the bankers used to evalu-
ate the fairness of the transaction. 93 The court also seemed to require a
minimum level of detailed information to be presented at the board meet-
ing.94 This approach parallels Lipton's precautionary formula for arriv-
ing at a good faith and informed decision, and departs from the more
classical standard of deference to directors under the business judgment
rule. By substituting its judgment as to how an investment banking opin-
ion should be prepared and presented, the court in effect denied the di-
rectors the discretion they were traditionally afforded in making
corporate business decisions.
A second case illustrating the Delaware courts' emphasis on proce-
dure for target directors in takeover situations is Moran v. Household
International, Inc. 95 In Moran, the Delaware Supreme Court upheld the
adoption of a poison pill,96 which Household had adopted to ward off
89. Id. at 712.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 712-14.
94. Id. at 711-12.
95. 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
96. For a definition of poison pill, see supra note 34.
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any takeover attempts,97 as a legitimate exercise of business judgment.
The court recounted the procedures followed by the Household board
when adopting the plan.98 Household secured the services of Wachtell,
Lipton, Rosen & Katz (as outside legal counsel) and Goldman, Sachs &
Co. (as outside investment bankers) to formulate a takeover policy for
recommendation to the board of directors. The court's opinion describes
the distribution of materials to the Household board concerning the
threat posed by the current environment of takeovers and the proposed
poison pill plan two weeks in advance of the board meeting at which the
plan would be considered. At the meeting itself, Lipton presented the
plan as well as information with respect to the frequency of "bust-up"
takeovers.
By applying the business judgment rule to protect the directors' ac-
tions in adopting the plan, the court effectively affirmed both aspects of
Lipton's approach: the legitimacy of manipulative defensive tactics, and
judicial emphasis on procedure when assessing informed business judg-
ment. First, the court held that the directors adopted the poison pill plan
in the good faith belief that it was necessary to protect Household'from
coercive acquisition techniques.99 The court concluded that the plan
"does not prevent stockholders from receiving tender offers, and that the
change of Household's structure was less than that which results from
the implementation of other defensive mechanisms upheld by various
courts.' ' I0 0
Second, the court detailed the procedure followed by the directors in
adopting the plan and concluded that the directors had made an in-
formed business judgment. In holding that the directors had not been
grossly negligent, the court recounted the board's procedure:
The information supplied to the Board on August 14 provided the
essentials of the Plan. The Directors were given beforehand a
notebook which included a three-page summary of the Plan along with
articles on the current takeover environment. The extended discussion
between the Board and representatives of Wachtell, Lipton and
Goldman, Sachs before approval of the Plan reflected a full and candid
97. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1348.
98. Id. at 1348.
99. Id. at 1357.
100. Id. at 1354. The court, however, ignored two important effects of the adoption of the
poison pill. First, the adoption of a poison pill generally causes the market price of stock to
drop. For example, Judge Posner noted in his opinion in Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS
Corp. that "the price of CTS shares dropped substantially the day after the poison pill was
announced, and rose again when the district judge's order invalidating the poison pill was
released." 794 F.2d 250, 257 (7th Cir. 1986), rev'd on other grounds, 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987).
Second, the court failed to consider the effect the adoption of the poison pill may have on the
number of tender offers made to the company. By making a hostile tender offer less certain to
succeed and more costly to the bidder, the poison pill reduces the price of each offer because
there is less of a competitive bidding market. Id.
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evaluation of the Plan. [A dissident director's] expression of his views
at the meeting served to place before the Board a knowledgeable cri-
tique of the Plan.' 0 '
The court emphasized the participation of outside counsel and in-
vestment bankers, the presentation made at the board meeting, and the
timing of the reports' circulation, 10 2 the very procedures recommended
by Lipton in his formulation of how to make an informed business judg-
ment. 10 3 A third case, Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 104 further
illustrates the pervasiveness of the Lipton formula. In Unocal, the Dela-
ware Supreme Court approved Unocal's discriminatory self-tender' 0 5 as
a legitimate defensive response to a takeover bid.' 0 6 Unocal offered to
purchase shares owned by its shareholders but excluded from this offer
all shares held by Mesa Petroleum, the hostile bidder.
The court again reaffirmed both aspects of Lipton's theory: the va-
lidity and necessity of manipulative defensive tactics, and the procedural
emphasis in the judicial assessment of informed business judgment. The
court found that there was directorial power both to oppose the Mesa
tender offer and to execute the self-tender. While discussing the consid-
erations that should go into formulating defensive tactics, the court cited
an article authored by Lipton. 0 7 The court concluded that the defensive
strategy was reasonable in relation to the threat posed, 108 even though in
executing the strategy the company would incur more than six billion
dollars of additional debt. 10 9
The court again recounted the procedures followed by the board
when deciding to reject the bid, noting the presence of outside legal coun-
sel and investment bankers, the management presentations, and the fact
that the meeting lasted nine and one-half hours. The court concluded
that the defensive strategy was implemented after a good faith, reason-
able investigation pursuant to a clear duty to protect the corporate
enterprise. "10
These cases demonstrate the extent to which the Delaware courts
have adopted the Lipton approach for evaluating target directors' actions
in takeover situations. This approach provides target directors with a
101. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1356 (footnote omitted).
102. Id. at 1356-57.
103. See Lipton, supra note 9, at 121-24.
104. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
105. See supra note 34 for a definition of self-tender. In this case Unocal bought back all
the shares in the company, except those owned by Mesa. The result was that Unocal effec-
tively transformed the company assets into debt, making it an unattractive acquisition for
Mesa. See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 950.
106. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 951.
107. Id. at 955.
108. Id. at 958.
109. Id. at 950.
110. Id. at 958.
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large reservoir of power from which to draw when devising defensive
tactics. Companies may manipulate the price of stock, as in Moran.
They may accumulate vast amounts of debt, as in Unocal. They may
even, as discussed below, create artificial antitrust problems.111
The courts indicate, and properly so, that they will approve deci-
sions made by target boards so long as the directors made a good faith,
reasonably informed decision. The courts err, however, when they at-
tempt to gauge how informed the directors were by assessing the proce-
dures followed before and during the board meeting (recommended by
outside experts), and the quality of outside expert opinions that were ob-
tained. It is evident from this approach that the outside lawyers and
investment bankers run the show. Without the lawyer's advice on proce-
dural protocol and neatly-packaged defensive strategies, the board of di-
rectors would have no basis upon which to make an informed business
judgment. Without the investment banker's opinion as to the adequacy
of the sale price, directors would have no judicially acceptable basis for
their determination of a fair sale price.
These results fly in the face of the rationale underlying the business
judgment rule. By assigning to the lawyer the role of impresario, the
courts have actually retracted the traditional deference accorded to di-
rectors in making business judgments. Presumably, corporate directors
with decades of experience in running corporations would be more quali-
fied to make these decisions than would lawyers, investment bankers, or
judges. This emphasis on procedure is overly burdensome to directors.
Out of necessity, these judicially-imposed standards compel the directors
to abdicate their traditional role, thereby allowing lawyers to manage
management.
IV. The Lipton Formula: Form Without Substance?
Despite the widespread acceptance of the Lipton formula, 112 its ap-
plication is often not in the best interests of the shareholders. Two cases
and their subsequent histories quite clearly illustrate the extent to which
111. Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092
(1981); see infra notes 113-32 and accompanying text.
112. But see Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 71, at 1161. Fischel and Easterbrook argue
for a rule of pure passivity by target management in response to a tender offer. This article and
Lipton's 1979 article together have spurred quite a scholarly debate. See Lipton, Takeover
Bids in the Target's Boardroom: A Response to Professors Easterbrook and Fischel, 55 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 1231 (1980); Bebehuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers, 95 HARV.
L. REV. 1028 (1982); Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers: A Reply
and Extension, 35 STAN. L. REV. 23 (1982); Easterbrook & Fischel, Auctions and Sunk Costs
in Tender Offers, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1982); Gilson, Seeking Competitive Bids Versus Pure
Passivity in Tender Offer Defense, 35 STAN. L. REV. 51 (1982); Gilson, A Structural Approach
to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REv. 819
(1981).
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the Lipton formula and its judicial adoption simply ignore the effect of
these transactions on shareholders.
The landmark case of Panter v. Marshall Field & Co. 113 illustrates
the negative effects that the use of defensive tactics can have on share-
holders. In Panter, Carter Hawley Hale (CHH), a national retail chain
that then operated the upscale retail store Neiman Marcus, expressed
interest in a merger with Marshall Field (Field), a direct competitor of
Neiman Marcus. 14
At the time of the merger proposal, Field's stock was selling at
about twenty-two dollars per share. Field, determined to remain in-
dependent, rejected CHH's advances. Worried about a takeover threat in
the offing, the Field board adopted two corporate expansion programs -
one of moving a Field store into a mall in Houston (which already con-
tained a CHH Neiman Marcus store), and the other of acquiring five
Liberty House stores in the Pacific Northwest. These expansion pro-
grams aggravated any antitrust problems with CHH that might have al-
ready existed, thus making it more difficult for CHH to acquire Field.
Soon thereafter, CHH announced its intention of making a tender offer at
forty-two dollars per share. Pursuant to the announcement, the market
price of Field stock rose to between thirty and thirty-four dollars per
share.
Field's board did not even discuss the merger proposal, determining
with the help of outside counsel that the antitrust problems would make
the merger illegal. A short time later, CHH withdrew its tender offer,
causing Field stock to drop to nineteen dollars per share.
Field's shareholders then brought a class action against Field and its
directors, alleging that the directors had breached their fiduciary duty to
the shareholders by depriving them of their opportunity to tender their
shares to CHH at a substantial premium over the market price.' 1 5 The
district court dismissed the action, and a divided Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals affirmed. Applying Delaware law, the Seventh Circuit held
that the business judgment rule applied to the directors' decisions to re-
main independent and defensively acquire property to purposefully cre-
ate antitrust problems.' 16 The court noted Field's reliance on outside
counsel and investment bankers, and the management reports at direc-
113. 646 F.2d at 271.
114. The following is a brief synopsis of the facts of the case. For a complete account, see
id. at 277-81.
115. Id. at 277.
116. Quoting the district court, the court of appeals described the standard to determine
whether the business judgment rule applied: "When [directors] act in good faith, they enjoy a
presumption of sound business judgment, reposed to them as directors, which courts will not
disturb if any rational business purpose can be attributed to their decisions." Id. at 293 (quot-
ing Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 486 F. Supp. 1168, 1194 (N.D. Ill. 1980)).
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tors' meetings.1 17
In reading the opinion, it is easy to imagine that the directors must
have had the Lipton article in front of them as they planned their defen-
sive tactics. The facts of the case read like a case study for the Lipton
theory. The following table illustrates the point:
117. Id. at 278-91.
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Lipton's Formula
1. Management, with the help of
outside legal counsel and investment
bankers, should make a full
presentation of all the factors
relevant to the consideration by the
directors of the takeover.
2. Hire independent investment
bankers to opine as to financial
aspects of merger.
3. Hire outside legal counsel to
opine as to any antitrust, legal, or
regulatory issues.
4. It is reasonable to reject a
takeover on any of the following
grounds:
(1) inadequate price;
(2) wrong time to sell; or
(3) illegality. 121
Marshall Field's Board Actions
1. "The special meeting of the
board took place ... with all
members present. Also at the
meeting were Field's attorneys and
investment bankers. The lawyers
... opined on the lack of legality of
the merger and the investment
bankers evaluated the financial
aspects of the merger. Field's
management then made a report and
projected that the company's future
performance would be generally
favorable. Many of the directors
agreed with the investment bankers
that a share of common stock would
bring more than $36.00 in a sale of
control of the company. After
consideration of the the above
factors, the directors voted
unanimously to reject the [merger]
proposal."' 18
2. Field hired independent
investment bankers who opined as
to the financial aspects of the
merger. "19
3. Field hired outside legal counsel
to opine as to the antitrust problems
that Field deliberately created to
scare off potential bidders.120
4. Field rejected CHH's proposal
on the following grounds:
(1) inadequate price;
(2) it was the wrong time to sell
(Field had a policy of
independence); and
(3) merger illegal because of
antitrust problems. ' 22
It is obvious that the Field directors used the Lipton formula, and
118. Id. at 279-80.
119. Id. at 279.
120. Id. at 278-79. Field also hired Joseph Flom, an attorney and merger and acquisition
specialist, in 1969 to advise them on how to respond to potential bidders. Flom advised Field
that making antitrust acquisitions was a legal way to "cope" with unfriendly takeover
attempts. Id. at 278.
121. Lipton, supra note 9, at 121-23.
122. Panter, 646 F.2d at 279-80.
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that the court bought the formula. The argument has come full circle-
Lipton himself now relies heavily on Panter:
The Panter court agreed with the proposition that where directors
reach their decision to reject a takeover bid after full consideration of
all of the interests affected by the proposal and after receiving antitrust
and securities law advice from outside counsel, they cannot be held to
have breached their fiduciary duties. The court also applied the busi-
ness judgment rule in evaluating the propriety of acquisitions by the
target which were alleged to have been made for the purpose of creat-
ing an antitrust impediment to the takeover. 123
In a related case decided eleven months later, 124 Field sued a prom-
inent raider, Carl Icahn. Field sought to enjoin Icahn from further
purchases of its stock. When the court refused to grant the injunction,
Field went out and found a white knight in British American Tobacco
(BATUS). 125 BATUS made a tender offer to Field for thirty dollars per
share, and the Field board approved it. 126 Interestingly, BATUS owns
Saks Fifth Avenue, a high quality national retail chain in direct competi-
tion with Marshall Field. In Icahn's application for a temporary re-
straining order against the tender offer from BATUS, he contended that
BATUS had not adequately disclosed potential antitrust problems. 127
The court simply stated that "the current state of disclosure is adequate
to alert shareholders to the potential problem." 28
The two Marshall Field cases demonstrate that when directors de-
cide to fight a takeover bid through manipulative defensive tactics, a bla-
tant disregard of shareholders' welfare occurs. In Panter, the directors
rationalized their actions by stating they wanted to remain independent,
which reflected a board policy of trying to build value within the com-
pany rather than putting it up for sale. 129 A short time later, however,
Field's directors were more than happy to surrender their independence
to BATUS.1 30
The antitrust claims in Panter also sound a hollow ring in light of
the subsequent Icahn case; Field's directors did not hesitate to embrace a
number of very real antitrust problems when they accepted the BATUS
tender offer. It is obvious that the antitrust issue was manufactured by
Field's board to handicap CHH as a bidder. 131
123. M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, supra note 2, § 601[1].
124. Marshall Field & Co. v. Icahn, 537 F. Supp. 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
125. A "white knight" is a party sought out by the target company to purchase its shares
during a hostile tender offer or proposed tender offer. See id. at 418.
126. Id. at 418, 420-21.
127. Id. at 420, 422.
128. Id. at 422.
129. See Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 296 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1092 (1981).
130. Icahn, 537 F. Supp. at 418.
131. See Panter, 646 F.2d at 290, 297-98.
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The "omnipresent specter that a board [adopting defensive tactics]
may be acting primarily in its own interest"'132 raises the question of
whether the directors really had the best interests of the company and
the shareholders in mind. The answer to that question becomes obvious
when the tender offer prices are reconsidered. CHH offered forty-two
dollars per share. The company was sold to BATUS at thirty dollars per
share. Not only did the shareholders ultimately sustain a loss of twelve
dollars per share, but the corporate treasury was also depleted in the
litigation process.
Beyond the disregard of shareholder welfare, the triumph of form
over substance also becomes apparent in the Marshall Field cases in an-
other respect. In the Panter case, the directors followed all the proce-
dures and created defensive tactics exactly in the manner advocated by
Lipton, and the defensive strategy worked in the manner desired. But the
later Icahn case shows that the directors had not genuinely made a good
faith judgment as they contended in Panter. The directors were actually
deciding whom to favor and whom not to favor on some basis other than
that claimed: the directors could not have been claiming in good faith
that the price offered by CHH (forty-two dollars) was inadequate when
they accepted the BATUS offer (thirty dollars) only eleven months later.
Another purported justification for rejecting the CHH proposal was that
Field had a "policy of independence"; yet they voluntarily merged with
another company eleven months later. Lastly, the directors obviously
manufactured the antitrust issue and invoked it discriminatorily.
If the stated motives for disapproving a merger were not the direc-
tors' real motives, then the procedural standard applied in analyzing the
validity of tender offer responses fails. The directors are making these
decisions based on motives that very likely are self-interested. Whatever
those ulterior motives are, the current judicial inquiry simply fails to
reach them. As a result the courts continue to allow target directors to
adopt defensive strategies that manipulate corporate charters and stock
prices without being able to assess the real motives behind those claims.
The failure of the Lipton formula, which emphasizes form and pro-
cedure in the assessment of an informed business judgment, to consider
adequately the shareholders' welfare or to analyze properly the actions of
directors is illustrated by a recent Delaware Supreme Court decision,
Smith v. Van Gorkom (Trans Union). 133 Trans Union involved a cash-
out merger between the Trans Union Corporation and the Marmon
Group, owned by Jay Pritzker. In 1980 Van Gorkom, Trans Union's
chairman and chief executive officer, was seeking a solution to Trans
132. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985).
133. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). The facts following in the text are abstracted from the full
opinion. Id. at 863-70.
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Union's tax credit problem. 134 With the help of senior management, Van
Gorkom determined that Trans Union should look for a company that
would be willing to buy Trans Union at a premium and take advantage of
Trans Union's large, unusual tax credit. Senior management discussed
the possibility of a leveraged buyout. In connection with that discussion,
the company financial advisors ran some numbers to determine the cash
flow necessary to service the debt that would probably be incurred in a
leveraged buyout, and came up with figures between fifty and sixty dol-
lars per share. At a management meeting, Van Gorkom noted that he
would take fifty-five dollars per share for the 75,000 shares that he
owned.
In a later conversation with personal acquaintance Jay Pritzker,
Van Gorkom mentioned the possibility of selling the company for fifty-
five dollars per share. Pritzker indicated serious interest in acquiring
Trans Union, and events proceeded rather quickly from that point. Soon
thereafter Pritzker made a cash-out merger proposal to buy Trans Union
at fifty-five dollars per share ($690 million for the entire company). 135
Two days later, the directors met to discuss the proposal. The meeting
lasted only two hours. Based on an oral presentation by Van Gorkom,
the financial advisor's statement, retained counsel's statement, and their
own knowledge of the company's financial history, the directors ap-
proved the merger. Two conditions were later attached: Trans Union
reserved the right to accept any better offer that was made during a
ninety-day market test period, and Trans Union could share its proprie-
tary information with other potential bidders. 136
The shareholders overwhelmingly approved the merger. Certain dis-
senting shareholders brought a class action suit seeking rescission of the
merger, and alternatively seeking damages against the members of the
Trans Union board individually.137
The Delaware Supreme Court held that the board had breached its
fiduciary duty to make an informed business judgment, had acted in a
grossly negligent manner, and had failed to disclose all material facts
before securing stockholders' approval. 138 A number of factors influ-
enced this outcome. The court was particularly troubled by Van
Gorkom's signing the merger contract at the Chicago Lyric Opera. The
134. Although the company had a large cash flow, it had difficulty in generating sufficient
taxable income to offset increasingly large investment tax credits. The chief executive officer of
Trans Union, Jerome Van Gorkom, lobbied Congress to have the investment tax credits re-
fundable in cash to firms that could not fully utilize the credit. He also lobbied the New York
Stock Exchange in an attempt to have the existence of these tax credits reflected in the stock
price. He was unsuccessful in both attempts. See id. at 864-65.
135. Id. at 867.
136. Id. at 869.
137. Id. at 863.
138. Id. at 874, 890-93.
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court also disapproved of the process because the directors never saw or
requested to see the merger documents before approving them, never ob-
tained outside investment banking advice concerning the fairness of the
merger terms, and accepted a purchase price for Trans Union that had
been determined rather informally.
Justice McNeilly wrote a vigorous dissent, characterizing the major-
ity opinion as "a comedy of errors."' 139 He took issue with the majority's
assessment of the directors' knowledge of the business affairs of the cor-
poration and their combined ability to act in the situation. He pointed
out that the directors had impeccable credentials:
The majority.., has effectively said that Trans Union's Directors have
been the victims of a "fast shuffle" by Van Gorkom and Pritzker. This
is the beginning of the majority's comedy of errors.... At the time the
merger was proposed the inside five directors had collectively been em-
ployed by the Company for 116 years and had 68 years combined ex-
perience as directors. The "outside" directors ... [with the exception
of one] were all chief executive officers of Chicago based corporations
that were at least as large as Trans Union. [They] had 78 years of
combined experience as chief executive officers, and 53 years cumula-
tive service as Trans Union directors .... Directors of this caliber are
not ordinarily taken in by a "fast shuffle"...... These men knew Trans
Union like the back of their hands and were more than well qualified
to make on the spot informed business judgments concerning the af-
fairs of Trans Union including a 100% sale of the corporation. 140
The dissent also pointed out that the directors had been dealing with the
finances of the company in great detail because of the tax credit
problems, and through this experience the directors had become acutely
aware of the company's prospects. 14 '
The Delaware Court of Chancery later approved a $23.5 million
dollar settlement of the lawsuit. 142 The parties stipulated and the court
agreed "that settlement ... upon the terms provided [in the Agreement]
is fair, adequate and reasonable and in the best interest of the Class.' 1 43
The amount of the settlement works out to approximately three and
four-tenths percent of what the Marmon Group actually paid for the
company ($690 million).
The opinion placed undue emphasis on the procedures the board
used in making the decision to accept Pritzker's offer. The court stressed
the need to have outside investment banking advice, the need for direc-
tors to read reports before meetings and question them at meetings, and
the need to build a record that makes the appearance of an unhurried,
139. Id. at 894 (McNeilly, J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 894-95 (McNeilly, J., dissenting).
141. Id. at 895 (McNeilly, J., dissenting).
142. Smith v. Van Gorkom, No. 6342 (Del. Ch. July 30, 1985) (Stipulation and Agree-
ment of Compromise and Settlement).
143. Id. at 10-11.
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well-advised decision-making process. Again, the opinion evidences fa-
miliar influence of the Lipton formula, and the consequent elevation of
lawyers and investment bankers to the role of impresario.
The case shows very clearly that the Lipton scheme has become in-
tegral to Delaware corporate jurisprudence. The case has stirred a storm
of controversy because it outlines in such detail all the requirements that
the Delaware Supreme Court deems necessary for directors to comply
with to pass muster under the duty-of-care requirment of the business
judgment rule. Trans Union illustrates the untenable, negative implica-
tion of the Lipton formula: if lawyers and investment bankers don't run
the show, and the directors rely upon their own professional judgment,
then the directors are guilty of gross negligence. 144
The opinion puts a great deal of emphasis on how the target direc-
tors made the decision to sell the company, and places little weight on
the substantive effect of the decision on shareholders. Because the Trans
Union directors did not jump through the correct procedural hoops, the
court declined to hold their actions protected by the business judgment
rule. While the process that resulted in the sale of the company may
seem somewhat unorthodox, the fact remains that the directors came
within three and a half percent of a "fair and reasonable" price for the
company.
Trans Union represents the apogee of the judicial preference for
form over substance. The court exalts the procedures followed by the
directors in making the decision over the substantive quality of the deci-
sion made; and the judiciary substitutes its own post hoe business judg-
ment for that of the board of directors. As Professor Fischel remarks:
In the final analysis, the issue facing the directors in Trans Union was
whether to accept the deal proposed and negotiated by Van Gorkom,
the most knowledgeable member of the board with strong incentives to
get the best deal possible, or attempt to get a better deal when doing so
entailed spending additional amounts on information and risking
winding up with nothing. This is the classic type of decision in which
corporate law has long recognized the directors, in light of their supe-
rior information and incentive to maximize the value of the firm, are
better able to assess the trade-off than individual shareholders, plain-
tiffs' attorneys, or courts.'145
Directors must be accorded some deference in the exercise of their
discretionary decision-making. Directors are elected to their position on
the basis of their business acumen and not on the basis of their ability to
read Lipton's corporate primer on mergers and takeovers. The strictures
144. Bayless Manning has written an article that catalogs the do's and don'ts of procedure
as recited in the opinion. The list reads almost like a digest of the Lipton article. See Man-
ning, Reflections and Practical Tips on Life in the Boardroom After Van Gorkom, 41 Bus.
LAW. 1, 8-14 (1985).
145. Fischel, supra note 38, at 1447.
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laid down in Trans Union simply do not allow for the flexibility directors
need to competently make these kinds of decisions. In the cash-out
merger proposal situation, in which directors have the statutory power to
make the decision, the courts ought to afford directors the deference
needed to react quickly in the exercise of their expertise and knowledge
of the corporation. This is the classic situation for application of the
business judgment rule.
In this decision, the Delaware court has created a virtual minefield,
and directors are exposed to tremendous personal liability unless they
adhere to the minutiae mapped out in Lipton's writings and espoused by
the Delaware courts. To confine directors to such burdensome proce-
dure, on the one hand, and to threaten them with vast personal liability
for a three and one-half percent margin of error, on the other, cannot
help but deaden the very decision-making skills for which directors are
elected. As discussed below in section VI, the inevitably dysfunctional
effects of such a standard have not escaped the notice of the Delaware
legislature, which has acted to limit the harm threatened by the court's
startling interpretation of the business judgment rule. 146
V. The Lawyer As Impresario
This Note has chronicled the use of the business judgment rule by
the Delaware courts in analyzing target directors' actions in takeover sit-
uations. In addition, it has examined the views of Martin Lipton on the
role of target directors, as well as the influence of his approach in the
Delaware courts. Lipton asserts that directors do not have to surrender
to takeover attempts; and, in fact, that it is good management policy to
defeat tender offer bids.1 47 Lipton also suggests a detailed list of proce-
dures to follow in making these decisions, and these procedures have
been virtually ratified by the Delaware Supreme Court.
The combined effect of this emphasis on plenary directorial power
and procedural tactics is to put lawyers at the helm in a takeover situa-
tion. Especially after opinions like Trans Union, corporate directors are
understandably apprehensive about relying on their own knowledge and
expertise to guide them in their decision-making processes. Under these
circumstances, lawyers become indispensable in leading the target direc-
tors through the detailed procedural requirements that the Delaware
courts use in analyzing informed business judgment in both merger and
tender offer situations. Lawyers are called upon to tell their clients how
much to read, how long to meet, and how to decide what is a fair price
for the company. Lawyers also are indispensable for providing compli-
cated manipulative defensive strategies to their corporate clients. 148 The
146. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 1986) (amended 1986).
147. See Lipton, supra note 9, at 110.
148. See Moran v. Household Int'l, 500 A.2d 1346, 1355 (Del. 1985).
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procedural protocol outlined by the courts and the planning of increas-
ingly complex defensive strategies require lawyers to advise, oversee, and
interject at every step in the decision-making process.
This Note contends that these developments in the law have ele-
vated the lawyer to the role of impresario. Although the lawyer as impre-
sario may spell good business for the legal profession, this development
does not necessarily translate into good business in the corporate arena.
The lawyer as impresario, however, is only one aspect of the problems
that have emerged from two key developments: first, the Delaware
courts' wholesale approval of exclusive directorial control of the deci-
sion-making process in hostile bid situations; and second, the Delaware
courts' espousal of a highly particularized set of procedures with which
to judge directors under the duty-of-care requirement of the business
judgment rule.
More fundamentally, the court has devised judicial standards that
essentially ignore shareholder welfare, as can be seen in the discussion of
Panter v. Marshall Field & Co. and Trans Union in section IV. Panter
demonstrates how defensive strategies can ultimately harm the share-
holders when used discriminatorily by the board to favor one bidder over
another. The net monetary loss to shareholders was twelve dollars per
share, amounting to a loss of twenty-nine percent from the purchase
price offered by the earlier bidder. 149 In Trans Union, the court myopi-
cally focused on the procedural details of the transaction, without exam-
ining the resulting harm to shareholders. The directors were found
guilty of gross negligence for an ultimate discrepancy in price amounting
to under four percent of the total purchase price. 150
Although ignoring shareholder welfare, courts will not necessarily
reach the "wrong" result in every case. Admittedly, Panter and Trans
Union serve as ideal models to illustrate the problems that have devel-
oped in Delaware corporate jurisprudence. Although not every merger or
takeover decision made under this standard will hurt the shareholders,
this does not justify neglect of the duties of care and loyalty by directors.
Under the standards advocated by Lipton, these fiduciary obligations
owed by the directors to the shareholders 51 are not effectively policed by
the courts.
The Delaware court's failure' to protect adequately shareholder wel-
fare leads to other problems as well. For instance, three objectionable
results flow from the Delaware courts' approval of manipulative defen-
sive strategies. First, the use of these defensive tactics does not guarantee
better conduct on the part of corporate directors. Target directors may
well have a personal interest in defending against a takeover. As Judge
149. See supra text accompanying note 132.
150. See supra text accompanying notes 142-44.
151. See supra notes 41-49 and accompanying text.
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Posner observed in Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp., "[w]hen
managers are busy erecting obstacles to the taking over of the corpora-
tion by an investor who is likely to fire them if the takeover attempt
succeeds, they have a clear conflict of interest .... ,,-52 The court in
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co. aptly characterized the conflict of
interest problem in takeover cases as an "omnipresent specter that a
board may be acting primarily in its own interests, rather than those of
the corporation and its shareholders .. .
Although the Delaware courts pay lip service to the idea that the
adoption of manipulative defensive tactics calls for enhanced judicial ex-
amination to address the potential conflict of interest problem, 54 they
have repeatedly found such tactics "reasonably related to the threats
posed," 1 55 or resulting in little more than a structural change. 56 As
demonstrated in the analysis of Panter, however, the justifications
claimed by directors for adopting defensive tactics do not always corre-
spond to the real reasons underlying their adoption. 57 With little judi-
cial oversight, the door is left open for target directors to adopt defensive
strategies for the sole purpose of maintaining their positions in the target
corporation.
The second objectionable result flowing from the adoption of defen-
sive tactics is the potential to manipulate stock prices and the corporate
charter, the latter without the otherwise required consent of the
shareholders. 158
Finally, the Delaware legislature has not granted any express power
to target directors to interfere materially with a tender offer. 159 The bid-
der makes a tender offer directly to the shareholders; it is for the share-
holders to decide how to respond to the offer. The directors have no
express statutory power to block a tender offer without the approval of
shareholders, yet the courts allow the directors to effectively deny the
shareholders their right to tender their shares into the offer.
For these reasons, the Delaware courts should reassess their ap-
proval of manipulative defensive tactics in the tender offer situation. The
courts should validate only those defensive tactics that insure fairness to
the shareholder in making the decision of whether to tender, and that
serve to disseminate the information needed to permit shareholders to
make an informed decision.
The second problematic aspect of Delaware law concerns the courts'
152. 794 F.2d 250, 256 (7th Cir. 1986), rev'd on other grounds, 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987).
153. 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985).
154. Id. at 954-55.
155. Id. at 956.
156. See Moran, 500 A.2d at 1354.
157. See supra notes 129-32 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text.
159. See supra notes 22-28 and accompanying text.
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detailed procedural analysis of whether directors have made an informed
business judgment that meets the duty-of-care requirement. As discussed
in section II, Lipton has developed a rationale for the adoption of defen-
sive strategies, as well as detailed recommendations for decision-making
procedures, which lend the appearance of an informed business judg-
ment. 160 As explored in section III, this theory has enjoyed enormous
success in both the boardrooms and courtrooms of Delaware. 161
The procedural formula, however, creates major dilemmas for direc-
tors in the merger context. It forces directors, who possess the experi-
ence and expertise to make complicated business decisions and the
statutory grant of power to make those decisions, to turn to lawyers and
investment bankers to perform that function for them. If directors do
not defer to the advice of lawyers and investment bankers, they run a
very real risk of having the court substitute its own judgment for that of
the directors, as well as of facing personal liability for gross negligence. 162
Additionally, the courts are imposing unreasoned and counter-
productive demands on directors when they attempt to specify just which
materials a director must examine before acting in a proposed merger
situation. This determination should properly be made on a case-by-case
basis; the amount of additional information reasonably necessary to
make an informed decision will vary from firm to firm and director to
director. 1 63
For these reasons, this Note proposes that when directors are given
the statutory power to make merger decisions, they should be afforded
the deference traditionally provided by the business judgment rule. Di-
rectors are much more qualified than are the courts to make these deci-
sions; indeed, that is the rationale underlying the business judgment rule.
Directors need the assurance that they can rely on their expertise to
make decisions in situations where time is of the essence. If there is a
significant resultant harm to the shareholders, they still have a remedy in
the courts. If the directors have violated their fiduciary duties of loyalty
and care to the shareholders, under the proposed standard, courts will be
able to assess those violations more effectively.
The lawyer has become impresario out of demand and necessity. As
some directors looked for ways to protect themselves from takeover bids,
they turned to lawyers for the means (and a rationale to justify those
means) with which to fashion defensive tactics. Part and parcel with that
package, they got a complicated set of procedures by which the courts
now judge their actions. This Note proposes a standard that takes the
reins from the lawyer, a standard whereby courts return to the tradi-
160. See supra notes 63-70, 76-83 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 84-111 and accompanying text.
162. See discussion of Trans Union, supra notes 133-46 and accompanying text.
163. See Fischel, supra note 38, at 1440-41.
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tional tenets of corporate governance and allow directors the freedom to
make decisions, when they have the authority to do so. This authority
does not include the power to enact manipulative defensive tactics that
artificially control stock prices or change the corporate charter without
the consent of the shareholders. Under this standard, review of direc-
tors' actions will more closely reflect the traditional concepts of the du-
ties of care and loyalty to the shareholder.
VI. Retrenchment of the Lipton Formula
Many members of the corporate bar viewed Trans Union as one of
the worst decisions in the history of corporate law. 164 Commentators
predicted dire consequences would follow when directors came to realize
how the decision had exposed them to personal liability. 65
The Delaware Legislature has heeded these warnings and predic-
tions. The legislature recently amended the Delaware code to allow cor-
porations to amend their charters to eliminate or limit the liability of
directors for breaches of their fiduciary duty of care. 166 The new code
provision, however, does not limit the liability of directors who have
breached their duty of loyalty or have engaged in intentional miscon-
duct. 167 In the synopsis accompanying the Senate bill, the legislature ex-
plained the problems that had led to its enactment:
Recent changes in [the market for liability insurance] . . . have
threatened the quality and the stability of the governance of Delaware
corporations because directors have become unwilling, in many in-
stances, to serve without the protection which insurance provides and,
in other instances may be deterred by the unavailability of insurance
from making entrepreneurial decisions. The amendments are intended
to allow Delaware corporations to provide substitute protection, in vari-
ous forms, to their directors and to limit director liability under certain
circumstances. 168
This statute significantly undercuts the court's holding in Trans
Union. By limiting directors' liability under the duty-of-care require-
ment, the statute allows directors the kind of freedom they need to make
complex corporate decisions. It also reflects the business community's
frustration with the minefield of liability that the courts have created in
adopting the procedural standard. 69 It can only be hoped that the
164. See Manning, supra note 144, at 1; Fischel, supra note 38, at 1455.
165. Manning, supra note 144, at 1.
166. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102 (b)(7) (Supp. 1986) (amended 1986).
167. Id.
168. S. Res. 533, 133rd Gen. Assem. (1986) (synopsis to bill) in (emphasis added).
169. In December 1986, 75% of Delaware corporations answering a survey intended to
seek stockholder approval for charter amendments authorized by § 102(b)(7). Balotti & Gen-
tile, Elimination or Limitation of Director Liability for Delaware Corporations, 12 DEL. J.
courts applying Delaware law will take the cue and re-examine the duty-
of-care standard as they have come to apply it.
A recent Delaware Supreme Court case also indicates a trend to-
ward narrowing the scope of deference afforded to target directors in
fashioning defensive tactics. In Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes
Holdings, 170 Revlon's board of directors instituted a number of defensive
tactics to thwart off a hostile takeover bid from Ronald Perelman, chair-
man of the board and chief executive officer of Pantry Pride.171
The Revlon court recognized that defensive measures are permitted
under Delaware law, but expressly limited their adoption to situations
that are untainted by directors' self-interest, and in which the particular
defensive measure has a rationally related benefit to stockholders. 172
This holding narrows the virtually unlimited discretion that the Dela-
ware courts previously afforded directors in a takeover situation. 73
The Revlon court also held that once a target company seeks to ne-
gotiate a merger or buyout with a third party, it has recognized that the
company is for sale. 174 At that point, the court reasoned, the whole ques-
tion of defensive measures becomes moot, and the "directors' role
change[s] from defenders of the corporate bastion to auctioneers charged
with getting the best price for the stockholders at a sale of the com-
pany." 75 This "auction" requirement recognizes that once the company
is for sale, there is no longer any justification whatsoever for the directors
to play favorites among bidders on any basis other than price. At that
point, any justified claim to a rationally related benefit to stockholders of
manipulative defenses ceases to exist.' 76
These developments indicate a certain retrenchment of the influence
of Lipton's construct. The Delaware legislature, in enacting a statute
permitting the limitation of the personal liability of directors, expressed
disapproval of the Trans Union case: directors should not be compelled
to adhere to the strictures of a procedural formula that unduly interferes
with the performance of their duties, or have to risk vast personal liabil-
ity for avoiding this standard. The Revlon case has put the brakes on the
wholesale judicial approval of the adoption of manipulative defense tac-
CORP. L. 5, 5 n.1 (1987) (citing survey by the American Society of Corporate Secretaries, 1
Corporate Counsel Weekly (BNA) No. 48, at 1 (Dec. 10, 1986)).
170. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
171. Id. at 176-79.
172. Id. at 181-82.
173. See supra notes 84-111 and accompanying text; see also Hanson Trust PLC v. ML
SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 227, 283 (2d Cir. 1986) (court applying New York law
enjoined target company's use of a lock-up option intended to ward off a hostile bidder, finding
that target directors had failed to ensure that the option had been negotiated with requisite
duty of loyalty to shareholders).
174. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 184.
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tics by requiring that any such measure result in some rationally related
benefit to the stockholders. The "auction" requirement of the Revlon
case further limits the previously unfettered directorial discretion to
adopt manipulative defense tactics-a limitation that collides with Lip-
ton's contention that directors should not have to act as auctioneers of
the company. 177
Conclusion
This Note has argued that the Delaware courts, by adopting the
Lipton formula, have elevated the lawyer to the role of impresario of the
merger and takeover processes. While the courts have allowed directors
broad discretion to adopt manipulative defense strategies in hostile take-
over situations, they have developed an overly restrictive procedural
standard for adjudging directors' fiduciary duty of care in both merger
and takeover decisions. In so doing, both the target directors and courts
have ignored shareholder welfare.
The judicial approach that has elevated the lawyer to the role of
impresario has resulted in serious problems:
1. Courts have allowed target directors to manipulate stock prices and
corporate charters through adoption of certain defensive strategies; and
2. Courts have effectively limited the business judgment of directors by
adopting a rigid procedural standard for adjudging whether directors
have met their duty of care.
To resolve these problems, the Note advocates a return to the tradi-
tional standards of corporate governance, and calls for the lawyer to step
down as impresario of the takeover process. Specifically, this Note pro-
poses that target directors in the tender offer situation should not be per-
mitted to adopt manipulative defensive strategies crafted by lawyers.
They should be permitted to adopt strategies that insure fairness to the
shareholder in the tender offer process and that aid him in making an
informed decision. This Note also proposes that when directors have the
power to make such decisions, as they do in the statutory merger context,
the courts should afford directors the deference traditionally extended
under the business judgment rule, rather than substitute their own judg-
ment as to how best to make corporate decisions.
Directors need the inherent flexibility of the rule in its traditional
form to freely make swift decisions using their expertise and knowledge
as directors. Directors, not lawyers or judges, should be making these
decisions.
If the judicial standards are reformulated in the manner recom-
mended in this Note, then the courts' case-by-case assessment of directo-
rial action in merger and takeover situations will more accurately reflect
177. See Lipton, supra note 9, at 109-13.
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the degree to which the directors have fulfilled the duty of loyalty and the
duty of care owed to the shareholders. Such reform would take corpo-
rate control out of the courtroom and return it to the boardroom.
